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THE TAXATION OF TRUST PROPERTY

By

ROBERT

C. BRowx*

The purpose of this paper is to examine the rules relating
to the taxation of property held in trust. The problem relates
only to property taxes in the correct sense of that term. Inheritance and income taxes, while undoubtedly burdening property
to some extent, are not strictly taxes on the property,' and will,
therefore, be disregarded here except to the extent that they
may throw light upon property taxes.
It would seem also that only intangible property offers any
real problem in this connection. Real estate has always been
subject to tax only by the taxing jurisdiction in which it is actually located. 2 While tangible personal property has not
always been treated in the same way, it now seems to be settled
that such property actually and permanently situated within
the boundaries of a particular taxing jurisdiction may be taxed
by that jurisdiction alone and without regard to the residence
of the owner. 3 The same rule should be applied to trust property.4 Although the interest of the beneficiary of a trust has a
certain similarity to a chose in action, yet such interest is a
property right rather than a mere contract right,5 and under
the maxim that equity follows the law, will be treated as real
or personal property according to the nature of the trust res.
A. B., Wesleyan (1914);
* Prof. of Law, Indiana University.
LL. B., Harvard (1917); S. J. D., Harvard (1930); contributor to
various legal periodicals.
3See Brown, The Nature of the Income Tax, (1933) 17 Minn.
I. R. 127.
2 III Cooley on Taxation (4th ed., 1924), see. 1066.
First lationalBank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct.
174 (1932) and cases there cited.
4 See People v. Gaus, 169 N. Y. 19, 6 N. E. 987 (1901).
5
Brown v. Pletcher, 253 U. S. 589, 35 Sup. Ct. 154 (1915).
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Where, however, the trust res consists of intangible property-as is perhaps more often than- not the situation nowadays-the problem is somewhat more difficult. The interest of
the beneficiary is no doubt still property, but the problem of the
taxation of the trust property itself is a very troublesome one.
The difficulty arises from the fact that choses in action and other
intangible property have generally no actual location. To assign to such property a "situs" for taxation is, therefore,
to indulge in a fiction. And the courts have shown a decreasing
disinclination to apply this fiction. Such property must, therefore, be regarded as actually situated nowhere-which is indeed
the fact.
But it would be even more absurd and improper to permit
such property to escape taxation altogether. The obvious solution is to permit the jurisdiction of the domicile of the owner
to tax intangible property. 6 However, the problem still remains, who is the owner of the property held in trust!
TnE

ORDINARY RULES AS TO

TAXATION

OF TRUST PtROPERTY

Taxation is a matter of strict law rather than equity, as
bhmost any taxpayer will cheerfully testify. The obvious solution, then, would be to determine whom a court of law regards
as the owner of the property. And there is no real doubt as to
the answer to this question-at law the property is of course
owned by the trustee. It is, therefore, not surprising to find
that, generally speaking, intangible property held in trust is
regarded as subject to tax by the taxing jurisdiction where the
trustee is domiciled and without regard to the domicile of the
beneficiary.7 The Supreme Court of Mississippi has stated the
rule succinctly as follows:
"The personal property covered by this assessment should have
trustee in his character as trustee at his resibeen assessed to the
S
dence or domicile."

The authorities to this effect are numerous.9
See cases cited in note 3, supra.
I Cooley on Taxation (4th ed., 1924), sees. 469-470. See also note
in (1930)
67 A. L. R. 393.
8
Board of Supervisors v. Dale, 40 Miss. 671, 70 So. 828 (1916). See
also 9Adams County v. Dale, 110 Miss. 671, 70 So. 828 (1916).
Atty.-Gen. v. Jewish Colonization Assn., (1901) 1 . B. 123;
Anthony v. Caswell, 15 R. I. 159, 1 Atl. 290 (1885); Price v. Hunter, 31
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This rule does not apply of course to property held by a
person who is really an agent rather than a trustee, whether
or not he is called a trustee. 10 In that case the agent has no
ownership of the property whatever, and it should normally be
assessed to the principal at his residence. But the rule does
apply to all sorts of fiduciaries having any legal interest in
property held by them for the benefit of someone else, including
guardians," trustees in bankruptcy, 12 and receivers.' 3 The
property is taxable to the trustee even though the validity of
the trust has been attacked, so long as such attack has not yet
been judicially determined to be justified.' 4 And the fact that
the settlor of the trust has a power of revocation, which he has
not yet exercised, should not affect the power to tax the intangible property to the trustee at his domicile.' 5 The power of revocation, whatever effect it may have on inheritance taxation,
has evidently no effect upon the present legal ownership of the
property in the trustee.' 6
If there are two or more trustees residing in different jurisdictions, the usual policy is to apportion the property equally
between the different trustees. It would certainly never do to
tax the whole property wherever any one of several trustees had
his domicile. As the Supreme Court of New Hampshire has
said in McClellan v. Concord:'7
"Each trustee is not liable for the tax on the whole property, for
such an assessment would result in taxing it as many times as 8there
are trustees, in violation of the established doctrine of taxation."'

This is also the prevailing rule in the authorities.' 9 A few
Fed. 355 (C. C. E. D. Pa., 1888); Augusta v. Kimball, 91 Me. 605, 40
Atl. 666 (1898); State V. Clark, 77 Minn. 190, 79 N. W. 829 '(1899);

McClellan v. Board, 200 Ill. 116, 65 N. E. 711 (1902); Higgins v. Commonwealth, 126 Ky. 211, 103 S. W. 306 (1907); Welch v. Boston, 221
Mass. 155, 109 N. E. 174 (1915); McClellan v. Concord, 78 N. H. 89,
97 Atl. 552 (1916); .Colonial-American Nat. Bank v. Commonwealth,
171 S. E. 596 (Va., 1933).

v. Muskegon, 158 Mich. 551, 123 N. W. 21 (1909).
.u See Kinhart v. Howard, 90 Md. 1, 44 Atl. 1040 (1899).
" Tennant v. State Board, 95 N. J.L. 465, 113 Atl. 254 (1921).
21 Schmidt v. Failey, 148 Ind. 150, 47 N. E. 326 (1897).
Detroit v. Lewis, 109 Mich. 155, 66 N. W. 958 (1896).
2$Hills

21

25People v. Wells, 118 App. Div. 881, 103 N. Y. Supp. 874 (1907),
affirmed 192 N. Y. 552, 85 N. E. 1114 (1908).

" See Lowndes, Tendencies in Taxation of Intangibles, (1930) 17
Va. L. R. 146, at 154 ff.

" Supra, note 9.
Is 97 Atl. 553.

"Appeal Tax Court v. Gill, 50 Md. 377 (1878); Mackay v. San
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cases ignore the residences of the trustees where the property
is in the form of documentary securities, 20 but the explanation
of this line of decisions is that the courts treat such documentary securities as tangible property and, therefore, tax it where
21
the documents are actually situated.
Even more clearly accepted is the rule that intangible
property is for taxation purposes to be divided equally between the trustees when they are all residents of the same state
but live in different municipalities or other taxing districts. 22
No case has been found which sanctions local taxation on the
basis of the full value of the property by mnore than one taxing
district in these circumstances. There are, however, cases
which permit the taxation of the property at the domicile of
the beneficiary rather than at that of the trustee or trustees
within the same jurisdiction. 23 This is allowable only as expressly provided by statute 24 but seems legally unobjectionable.
The same may be said of the scheme for taxing trustees on the
share of the property held for them by. nonresident beneficiaries. 25 But when resident beneficiaries are taxed upon their
interests as property, the trustees being non-residents of the
state,2 6 there arises an immediate problem of multiple taxation,
Francisco, 128 Cal. 678, 61 Pac. 382 (1900); People v. Feitner, 168
N. Y. 360, 61 N. E. 280 (1901); Crocker v. Malden, 224 Mass. 313, 118
N. E. 527 (1918).
xPeople v. Coleman, 119 N. Y. 137, 23 N. E. 488 (1890); People v.
Tax Commissioners, 17 N. Y. Supp. 923 (1891).
=The idea that documents representing choses in action and other
intangible property are themselves tangible property, seems to have
much practical sense; but it has been pretty definitely repudiated, at
least for taxation purposes, by the Federal Supreme Court. Blodgett
v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410 (1928). See also Baldwin v.
Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1930). It would appear, therefore, that the cases cited in note 20, supra, cannot now be sustained,
at least on this basis.
wHardy v. Yarmouth, 6 Allen, 277 (Mass, 1863); Baltimore v.
Ridgely, 29 Md. 48 (1868); Trustees v. City Council, 90 Ga. 634, 17
S. E. 61 (1892); Yardley v. Essex county, 93 N. J. L. 290, 108 Atl. 299
(1919). The same rule has been applied where the trustees lived in
different boroughs of New York City. People v. O'Donnel, 183 N. Y. 9,
75 N. E. 540 (1905).
Greene v. Mumford, 4 R. I. 313 (1856); In re A7lman, 17 R. I.
362, 222 Atl. 279 (1891).
,In re Ailman, supra, note 23,
zW. Chester School District v. Darlington, 38 Pa. 157 (1861);
Baltimore v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. 97 Md. 659, 55 Atl. 316 (1903).
Humbird v. State Tax Commission, 141 Md. 405, 119 Atl. 157
(1922). See also Davis v. Macey, 124 Mass. 193 (1878).
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since the trustees will presumably be subject to tax upon the
trust property at their own domiciles. This problem will be
considered hereafter.
As just suggested, there is some tendency to provide for
the taxation of property held in trust to the beneficiary at his
domicile rather than to the trustee. 2 7 It has been urged that
this is a more scientific and more desirable -way to tax such
property, on the ground that the beneficiary is the actual owner
.of the property as distinguished from the merely technical
legal ownership resting in the trustee, whose domicile should
therefore be disregarded. 28 There is some direct judicial authority for this view 29 though ordinarily only when expressly
so provided by statute. 30 This ruling may indeed be justifiable
in certain peculiar sorts of trusts, even without express statutory authority. An example of this is a voting trust,31 which,
though a genuine and active trust, is nevertheless one for a very
limited purpose, and one where the certificate holder is in most
substantial particulars, the complete owner of the stock. Similarly, where the beneficiary is exempt from property taxation,
it would seem improper to deny the exemption by assessing the
property to the trustee.3 2
But, as already pointed out, the distinct weight of authority favors the taxation of all trust property to its legal owner,
the trustee. The truth is that there is more than a technical
legal reason for this. If one or all of the beneficiaries are future,
they might well be unable to pay the tax.3 3 And even if all the
7 See the cases cited in notes 23-26, supra.
0 See the note in (1928) 41 Harv. L. R. 511.
V Carlisle v. Marshall, 36 Pa. 397' (1860). See also In re Line's
Estate, 155 Pa. 378, 26 Atl. 728 (1893).
:"Matter of Ming, 39 N. J. Eq. 1 (1884).
nState Tax Commission v. Baltimore County, 138 Md. 668, 114
Atl. 717 (1921).
' Williston Seminary v. County Commissioners, 147 Mass. 427, 18
N. E. 210 (1888). But in Parklhurstv. Winchester, 234 Mass. 121, 125
N. E. 152 (1919) it was held that the primary purpose of the trust
was to pay annuities rather than to accumulate for future beneficiaries,
and that the property was therefore taxable to the trustees. The court
remarked that it might be difficult to collect the tax from these future
beneficiaries "who may be unable to pay it." In Ellsworth College v.
Emmet County, 156 Ia. 52, 135 N. W. 594 (1912), the property was
held taxable to the trustees,- but the exempt status of the beneficiary
was given effect to, by treating the property itself as exempt in the
hands of the trustees.
"See Parkhurstv. Winchester, supra, note 32.
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beneficiaries are existing, they are possibly somewhat scattered,
may be rather indigent, and are at any rate extremely unlikely
to be acquainted with business practices. Certainty and convenience of collection seem, then, to dictate a continuance of the
present scheme of collecting the tax from the trustee.
However, there may be more justification for some modification of this rule when a business trust is involved. Even
here the same rules as to property taxation should probably be
adhered to when there is a real trust,3 4 but such devices are
often trusts only in name. 35 If the so-called beneficiaries have
any substantial control over the person acting as trustee, it is
rather a partnership than a trust.
But even under those circumstances, the property is often
taxed to the so-called trustee at his domicile. Of course, if
the trust res consists in whole or in part of real property, it is
taxable at its actual situs, irrespective of the residence of the
trustee or beneficiaries. 6 It is sometimes considered that where
the so-called business trust is actually a partnership, the doctrine of equitable conversion will transform the real estate into
personal property.37 However, it would seem that this should
make no difference, as even if it is personal property, it still has
a permanent situs where the land is situated, and is therefore
taxable only in that jurisdiction.
The result seems to be that the property taxation problem.
of business trusts, in the correct sense of that term, is essentially
the same as that of the more ordinary sort of trusts, where
Active business is not intended to be carried on. At any rate
decisions with respect to these trusts do not show any very
definite tendency to deviate from the ordinary rule that the
property is taxable only at the domicile of the trustee and not
to the beneficiaries.
Possibly a more tenable suggestion for varying the ordinary rule for taxation of trust property is to tax it in the juris3Ricker v. American L. & T. Go.. 140 Mass. 346 (1885); Greene
County v. Smith, 148 Ark. 33, 228 S. W. 738 (1921). See also. Western
Assur. Co. v. HaZliday, 110 Fed. 259 (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1901).
See Brown, Common Law Trusts as Business ,nterprise, (1928)
3 Ind. L. J.595.
'$Dana v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 227 Mass. 562, 116 N. E.
914 (1917); Priestley v. Burrill, 230 Mass. 452, 120 N. E. 100 (1918).
2 Baker v. Commissioner, 253 Mass. 130, 148 N. E. 593 (1925).
See also, Priestley v. Burrifl, supra, note 36.
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diction where it is intended that the trust shall be operated.
This suggestion has an obvious application to trusts where it
is intended that active business should be carried on, but is
by no means necessarily confined to such trusts.
The frsi actual application of such an idea seems to have
been in situations where -there were several trustees, some of
whom were inactive. In such cases it has sometimes been held
that the jurisdiction of residence of the active trustee or trustees
could properly tax the whole property without regard to the
inactive trustee. 38 At times this idea has been applied even by
the domicile of the inactive trustees, thus resulting in a loss of
9
On the other hand, the
revenue to the state thus applying it.3
as it now
been
influenced-improperly,
courts have sometimes
40
appears -to tax intangible trust property at the location of
the documents representing such property rather than at the
place where the active trustees are domiciled. 41 And there are,
likewise, authorities which explicitly decline to give up any revenue on this theory,4 2 asserting that the inactive trustees are
still trustees and that the state of their domicile is, therefore,
entitled to its share of the tax of the trust property.
But if such an idea is accepted at all it is then only a
short step to the conclusion that the jurisdiction where the
trust is really managed is the one to tax the trust property.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Newcomb v.
Paige43 has taken cognizance of these practical considerations
in the following language (speaking of the resident trustee) :
"Under these circumstances he alone as resident of this commonwealth does not hold the title as owner within the commonwealth in
such sense as to bring him within the tax act. He cannot exercise
ownership as a resident in this commonwealth, but only by conjoint
action with his fellow trustees, none of whom are resident here, as to
a fund in substance in the custody of the courts of another jurisdiction.
'Johnson v. Oregon City, 3 Ore. 13 (1868); Hawk v. Bonn, 6 Oh.
C. C. 452 (1892). See also, People v. Barker, 8 Misc. 32, 28 N. Y. Supp.
651 (1894).
"People v. Coleman, supra, note 20; People v. Tax Commissioners,
supra, note 20; Hawk v. Bonn, supra, note 38.
" See cases cited in note 21, supra.
4'People v. Coleman, supra, note 20; People v. Tax Commissioners,

supra, note 20.
"People v. Commissioners of
In re Haight, 32 App. Div. 496, 53
v. Milton, 217 Mass. 230, 104 N. E.
'224 Mass. 516, 113 N. E. 458

Tazes, 38 Hun. 536 (N. Y., 1886);
N. Y. Supp. 226 (1898); Hemenway
362 (1914).
(1916).
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His ownership is not of such character as to bring the taxable domicile of the trust within the terms of our law.""

And the same court has gone still farther in its application of this idea of the practical control of the trust as localizing
the power of imposing a property tax, in Iitohins v. Commissioner.45 Here the residences of the trustees and beneficiaries
of the trusts in question were entirely ignored and the Massachusetts tax was thus given up, on the ground that the trusts
were created under the laws of foreign jurisdictions and were
actually administered there.46 It must be admitted that this
case involves an income tax rather than a property tax in the
strict sense of that term. Nevertheless, it seems to be in point,
since the Massachusetts court has the settled, though rather unfortunate, idea that an income tax is a form of property tax47
ation.
But undoubtedly the clearest authority, in favor of this
theory of levying a tax upon trust property according to the
place where the trust is to be administered, is the Minnesota
case of In re Thorne's Estate.48 This case involves strictly a
question of inheritance taxation, but is in point as tq property
taxation, since it is now quite clear that, as a general rule,
property which is outside the jurisdiction of a state for property tax purposes can not constitutionally be used as a basis for
49
imposing an inheritance tax.
In the Thorne case a resident of New York died, leaving an
interest in a trust consisting mostly of corporate stocks. Two
of the four trustees were residents of Minnesota, the other two
were residents of New York. It appeared that the trust agreement was signed in New York and that most of the trustees'
meetings were held there. However, it was entirely clear not
only that most of the tangible assets represented by the stocks
constituting the trust res were in Minnesota, but also that the
trust was intended to be, and actually was, managed there. On
these facts the Minnesota Court held that the state had jurisdic"113 N. E. 460. But cf. Hem enway v. Milton, supra, note 42.
4272 Mass. 422, 172 N. E. 605 (1930).
4See
comments on this case in (1930) 79 U. of Pa. L. R. 219, and
(1931) 44 Harv. L. R. 475. These point out that the Massachusetts
court has not been consistent on this point.
4, See Brown, op. cit. note 1, supra, at pp. 132 if.
4145 Minn. 412, 177 N. W. 638 (1920).

0 "irst NVational Bank of Boston v. Maine, sulra, note 3.
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tion to impose an inheritance tax upon the passing of the estate,
saying:
"The proposition that a trust has a situs so as to afford a basis
for claiming an inheritance tax is not entirely novel, although courts
in determining the location may not always stress the same factors.
Varied importance is given to the residence of the trustees, the residence of the settler, the place of the administration of the trust, and
the location of the trust property. Professor J. H. Beale, in an article
in the Harvard Law Review for April, 1919, arrives at the conclusion
that a succession tax is payable at the place of the administration or
seat of the trust."50

It is believed that this general idea is theoretically sound 5 '
though it is not quite so clear whether it is as easily workable as
tle prevailing somewhat wooden but certainly convenient rule
that the intangible property of the trust is to be taxed at the
domicile of the trustee. However this may be, the Thornse
case failed to pass the scrutiny of the same court in the light
of subsequent developments. It was explicitly overruled in
Baker v. State,5 2 which involved precisely the same trust as
that in the Thorne case. The court did not criticize its former
theory that trust property may properly be subjected to tax
where the trust is to be administered, but took the position that
this trust, which was intended to enforce a consistent and harmonious policy in the management of several large mining corporations, was itself essentially a corporation (or at least should
be governed by like rules), and being organized in New York
its stock could not be subjected to taxation by Minnesota under
the doctrine of the recent case of First National Bank of Boston
53
v. Maine.
It is submitted that the Baker case does not invalidate the
holding of the Thorne case in so far as that case is based upon
the proposition that trust property is to be taxed at the place
where the trust itself is managed-the "set of the trust." 54
The Baker case was based on the theory that the so-called trust
was not really a trust at all. And there are still a number of
cases, whose authority has not yet been attacked, which give
177 N. W. 640.

8 See note by Professor J. H. Beale in (1920) 34 Harv. L. R. 52.
He states that the Thorne case justifiably provides for property taxation "at the seat of the trust."
2186 Minn. 160, 242 N. W. 697 (1932).

5 Supra, note 3.

"Cf. note 51, supra.
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support to this view that trust property is to be taxed where the
trust is managed. 55
It is therefore fair to consider this problem on its merits.
The theory of taxing trust property at the place where the trust
is to be administered has undoubtedly much logical and scientific basis. 56 Nevertheless, it may be criticized as somewhat unworkable. The problem of deciding 'as to what is really the
place of administration of the trust -will often be very difficult,
and, furthermore, disagreements as to this between various
courts might give rise to quite objectionable multiple taxation.
And if this does not happen, it might well result in an unjustifiable loss of revenue to states which held that the property was
to be managed in some other state, even though some or all of
the trustees were residents of the state considering the problem
Therefore, it again seems wiser to adhere to the more easily
workable theory that intangible trust property is to be taxed at
the domicile of the trustee.
There is, however, still another and in some ways more serious diversity in this general subject, and that is with respect to testamentary trusts. Where property is held under
such a trust, it has large practical similarity (though not legal
identity) to the holding by a decedent estate. It is, therefore,
not surprising that there is some tendency to reflect the rule
as to the taxation of property held by decedent estates in tdxing
property held under testamentary trusts. And that rule is to
tax the property of a decedent estate at the domicile of the
decedent, irrespective of the residence of either his personal
representative or the beneficiaries of the estate;57 though this
right may, of course, be given up by the state of the decedent's
domicile. 58
Nevertheless, the general rule is still to treat testamentary
trusts like other trusts and to hold, therefore, that property of
such trusts is taxable at the domicile of the trustee. 59 The rule
"See cases cited in notes 38, 39, 43 and 45, supra.
5,Cf. note 51, supra.
5TGallatin v. Alexander, 10 Lea 475 (Tenn., 1882).
"In re Haight, supra, note 42.
".Johnson v. Oregon City, supra, note 38; Dalzinger v. Rapello, 14
Fed. 32 (1882), 15 Fed. 434 (1883) (C. C. D. Mass.); In re Ailman,
supra, note 23; Augusta v. Kimball, supra, note 9; Hemenicay v. Milton, supra, note 42; McClellan v. Concord, supra, note 9. Several of
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is not the same where there is a bequest of an annuity,6 0 as this
is neither technically nor substantially a trust.
But with property held by an estate being taxed one way
and property held by a testamentary trust being taxed another
way, a difficulty arises in drawing the line between them. This
is particularly the case where the same individual is named as
executor and trustee. It will then obviously be somewhat difficult to determine when he passes from one capacity to the
other, and, therefore, (if he happens to be a resident of another
taxing jurisdiction from the decedent) when the proper situs of
the property for taxation will change. There are several cases
where this distinction between executors or administrators and
trustees is not really recognized by the court.6 ' On the other
hand a testamentary trust may be created in fact, even though
that term is not used by the testator.62 In general, it would
seem that where the same person is appointed executor and
trustee and submits his accounts as executor, which accounts
are approved, he thereafter holds the property as trustee. 63
Still
more plainly is this the case if he has been actually discharged
as executor, 4 or where he goes through the formality of transferring the property of himself as executor to himself as trustee.6 5 But such pe-sonal representatives, axMd even the courts
themselves, are often so careless in drawing the line between
activities as executor and activities as testamentary trustee6 6
that the property tax problem, as well as others depending upon
this distinction, may become very troublesome.
The situation is further complicated in the case of decedent estates by the frequent appearance of an ancillary executor. There are not -wanting authorities which hold that a
state where an ancillary executor is appointed for the estate of
these cases fail to distinguish between executors and testamentary
trustees.
0*Gray v. Boston, 15 Pick. 376 (Mass., 1834); gweett v. Boston, 18
Pick. 123 (Mass., 1836). But cf. Tirrellv. Commissioner of Corporations
and 6Taxation, 192 N. E. 77 (Mass., 1934).
People v. Commissioners of Taxes, supra, note 42; Walla Walla
V. Moore, 16 Wash. 339, 47 Pac. 753 (1897). And cf. note 59, supra.
Clark V. Powell, 62 Vt. 442, 20 At. 597 (1890).
"Hardy v. Yarmouth, supra, note 22.
"Mackay v. San Francisco, supra, note 19.
"Millsaps v. Jackson, 78 Miss. 537, 30 So. 756 (1901).
" State v. Beardsley, 77 Fla. 803, 82 So. 794 -(1919), holding that
the mere payment of the debts of the decedent transforms his executor
into a trustee.

K. L. J.-2
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a non-resident decedent, is entitled to tax property held by such
ancillary executor in the state of his appointment.6 7 However,
other authorities decline to impose such a tax,6 s leaving it to the
jurisdiction where the decedent was a resident.
Conversely, where the decedent was a resident of the taxing state but the executor is a non-resident of that state and has
been appointed ancillary executor in the state of which he is a
resident, some authorities hold that property of the estate in
the hands of the ancillary executor in the state of his residence
is not taxable by the state in which the decedent was domiciled.6 9 This problem is frequently confused by the
nature of the property. Though many courts, even at the
present date, do not seem to fully recognize it, a state can not
tax realty or intangible personal property permanently situated
outside its borders, even though it belongs to a resident of the
state or to a resident decedent estate.7 0 If, however, the property is intangible, the state where the decedent was a resident
certainly has the power to tax it, irrespective of the residence of
the main or ancillary executor. 71
It is evident, therefore, that there is a legal right, and in
fact a strong tendency, to tax intangible property of a decedent estate at the domicile of the decedent, irrespectiye of the
residence of his personal representative having charge of the
estate. The theory is that the executor or administrator has an
"official residence" in the jurisdiction where his decedent had
his residence; and this irrespective of the actual residence of
the personal representative. This theory is accepted quite generally with respect to executors, administrators, and other personal representatives. 7 2 And there are a few authorities who
O'Baldwin v. Shine, 84 Ky. 502, 2 S. W. 164 (1886); Dorris v.
Miller, 105 Ia. 564, 75 N. W. 482 (1898).
3State v. Lewis, 256 Mo. 98, 165 S. W. 319 (1914), substantially
overruling on this point, State v. St. Louis County Court, 47 Mo. 594
(1871).
3Putnam v. Middleborough, 209 Mass. 456, 95 N. E. 749 (1911);
Gray v. Lenox, 215 Mass. 598, 102 N. E. 1097 (1913); Crosby v. Charlestown, 78 N. H. 39, 95 Atl. 1043 (1915).
,oSee authorities cited in notes 2 and 3, supra.
11
Gallatin v. Alexander, supra, note 57.
'Atty.-Gen. v. Campbell, L. R. 5 H. L. 524 (1872); Gallup v.
Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196, 56 N. E. 443 (1900), affirmed in 183 U. S. 300,
22 Sup. Ct. 162 (1902), on the ground that no federal question was
presented; Rand v. Pittsfield, 70 N. H. 530, 49 Atl. 88 (1901); Commonwealth v. Williams, 102 Va. 778, 47 S. E. 867 (1904); Commonwealth v.
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hold that the same rule of "official residence" at the domicile
73
It
of the decedent is applicable to a testamentary trustee.
follows that, according to such cases, the property held in testamentary trust is to be taxed by the jurisdiction in which the
testator had his home at the time of his death, irrespective of the
actual residence of the trustee. Such decisions may be erroneous, but they are not difficult to understand, in view of the
practical difficulty, which has already been pointed out, of distinguishing sharply between the functions of executor and testamentary trustee, when, as is often the case, the same person is
appointed to both offices.
However, the theory of an "official residence" for a testamentary trustee as separate from his actual residence for this
purpose, is denied by a number of authorities. The point is
clearly brought out in the Mississippi case of Millsaps v. JackSoW14 where the court held that property in the hands of executors should be taxed at the domicile of the decedent, but when
transferred to themselves as testamentary trustees, the property
should be taxed at their respective doiniciles proportionately.
There are many other authorities to the effect that the taxation
of property held in a testamentary trust is not different from
that of other trust property;75 that is, it is to be taxed at the
residence of the trustee, or if there is more than one trustee,
it is to be divided proportionately among them. In other words
the concept of "official residence" is denied, at least for the
present purpose, with respect to testamentary trustees. In one
case 76 the doctrine of "official residence" for a testamentary
Peebles, 131 Ky. 121, 119 S. W. 774 (1909); McKennon v. Fall, 127
Tenn. 393, 155 S. W. 158 (1913); Yardley v. Essex County, supra,

note 22.

"Lewis v. Chester, 60 Pa. 325 (1869); Baldwin v. Washington
County, 85 Md. 145, 36 At. 764 (1897), appeal dismissed for want of
jurisdiction in 168 U. S. 705, 18 Sup. Ct. 939 (1897); Goodsite v. Lam,
139 Fed. 593 (C. C. A., 6th Circ., 1905). See also, Crocker v. Malden,
supra, note 19.
"4Supra,note 65.
15Augusta v. Kimball, supra, note 9; Welch v. Boston, supra, note
9; Newcomb v. Paige, supra, note 43; Guthrie v. Pittsburgh etc. Ry.
Co., 158 Pa. 433, 27 Atl. 1052 (1893); State v. MeCausland, 159 Mo.
185, 55 S. W. 218 (1900); Maxwell v. People, 189 Ill. 603, 59 N. E.
1098 (1901); State V. Beardsley, supra, note 66. See also People v.
Wells, 182 N. Y. 314, 74 N. E. 678 (1905).
,1 Guthrie v. Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co., supra, note 75. Cf. Lewis v.
Chester, supra, note 73, which was distinguished on this ground.
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trustee was accepted where the trustee was actually appointed
by the court of the domicile of the decedent, but denied when
that court merely supervised the execution of the trust. It is
submitted that rules based upon such hair-splitting distinctions
should not be followed, and that'"official residence" should
be given up for taxation purposes with respect to testamentary
trusts.
Indeed, there is considerable authority which seems to deny
the concept of official residence in toto even as respects executors and other personal representatives of the testator. 7
According to this doctrine the taxability of intangible property in
the hands of the representatives of an estate is to be determined
according to the domicile of the representatives themselves and
without regard to the domicile of the decedent. The Supreme
Court of Washington' 8 has pointed out that any rule subjecting
the property held by a decedent estate to tax at the residence
of its former owner may result in its being taxed there forever
if the estate is never technically settled; and this is obviously
somewhat ridiculous. But whatever may be the justification
for the application of the concept of "official residence" in the
case of executors and administrators, it is apparent that such a
concept is unrealistic, njust and unworkable where the property is held by a testamentary trustee. Property of a testamentary trust should, therefore, be taxed like other trust
property; namely, at the actual domicile of the trustee.
MuLTnIPT

TAxATIoN

o

TRusT

PROPERTY

But the most serious problem remains. Obviously the trustee has the legal title to the property of the trust, and upon such
property he mKay be, and generally is, taxed. Just as truly the
beneficiary has an interest in the trust property, which interest
is more than a contract right; it is itself property. 9 Can the
trustee and the beneficiary both be taxed!. They both have
property, but if this is allowed, the same economic interest is
TDallingerv. Rapezlo, supra, note 59; State v. Corson, 56 N. J. L.
381, 13 Atl. 265 (1888); Commonwealth v. Camden, 142 Ky. 365, 134
S. W. 914 (1911); Crosby v. Charlestown, supra, note 69; People v.
Go7dfogle, 219 App. Div. 576, 220 N. Y. Supp. 337 (1927). And cf.
Stanford v. San Francisco, 131 Cal. 34, 63 Pac. 145 (1900).
"In Walla Walla v. Moore, supra, note 61.
7' Brown v. Fletcher, supra, note 5.
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being subjected to more than one tax. While such economic
double taxation is being increasingly frowned on, 80 it does -not
yet appear to be fully done away -with, and so it may be that
this sort of multiple taxation is legally justifiable. Morally justiflable it does not seem to be. The only reason that the intangible property is subjected to such a heavy tax burden is that it
is held in trust, which seems no justification at all. Furthermore, the whole burden of such multiple taxation will fall upon
the beneficiary. 8 ' He must pay the tax on his own interest, and
he must really bear the tax on the trustee's interest, since this
is obviously a proper charge in the execution of the trust, which
the trustee can and will make against the income otherwise payable to the beneficiary. The trust device was, at least originally
and primarily, for the particular protection of the beneficiary;
the permitting of such multiple taxation would transform it
into an agency for burdening the helpless beneficiary more than
persons who are not beneficiaries of trusts and who, therefore,
supposedly do not need the same protection. Protection at the
price of multiple taxation obviously costs too much.
Yet it is hardly surprising tlat such multiple taxation
has been claimed and in many instances actually collected by a
number of our states, hard pressed, as all of them are, especially
in these times, for necessary revenue. The theoretical argument
is perfectly simple. The trustee has property and this property
is taxable at his domicile. The beneficiary also has property
(an equitable interest, it is true, but still property) 82 which is
likewise taxable at his domicile. And finally the separate property of the trustee and of the beneficiary are of equal value,
this value being the market value of the trust res. Nothing
could be simpler.
And until rather recently the power to impose such multiple taxation, though no doubt recognized as somewhat unjust,
was not regarded as subject to serious attack. An outstanding
authority in this field wrote as recently as 1919:
,oSee the cases cited in note 3, supra.
See note, State Power to Impose a Property Tax on the Interest
of a Beneficiary of a Trust, (1930) 30 Col. L. R. 539.
-Brown v. Fletcher, supra, note 5.
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"The power of the state of his residence to tax the beneficiary of a
trust cannot be doubted."' 2
This means multiple taxation,

for there is

not, and never

was any doubt of the power of the state of his residence to tax
the trustee.

A similar statement appears in the latest edition

of the leading text on taxation.8 4
Perhaps something should be said, in the first place, as
to the application to this problem of cases involving other
than property taxation. They are frequently cited in cases involving the taxation of trust property, and we should, there-

fore, consider how far they are really entitled to be treated
as authorities.
Probably

inheritance

tax cases

are the most commonly

cited in connection with property tax problems. There is a definite tendency, which has culminated in a number of recent de-

cisions of the Federal Supreme Court,8 5 to wipe out multiple
inheritance taxation.

Nevertheless, there are a number of au-

thorities, which are possibly still in good 9tanding, to the effect
that the beneficiaries of a non-resident trust must pay an inheritance tax even though the domicile of the settlor of the trust
8 6
The Federal Suor of the trustee also collected such a tax.
preme Court has also approved this doctrine,sT -though it may
perhaps be doubted whether the court would now adhere to this
ruling, especially in view of the later case of Wachovia Bank &
5 5
Trust Co. v. Doughton.

In this last case a resident of Massa-

chusetts gave property to a Massachusetts trustee for his daugh-

ter for life, then as she might appoint.

The daughter lived in

North Carolina and made the appointment by will in that state.
"Prof. J. I-L Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax, (1919) 32 Harv. L. R.
587, 620.
s' i Cooley on Taxation (4th ed., 1924), loc. cit., note 7, supra. See
also see. 230.
8- See the cases cited in note 3, supra.
8GIn re Line's Estate, supra, note 29; In re Douglas County, 84
Neb. 506, 121 N. W. 593 (1909); In re DiZlinghamr's Estate, 196 Cal.
525, 238 Pac. 367 (1925). But see Re Helena, 236 Pa. 213, 84 Atl. 665
(1912), where this rule was approved, but a different result was
reached, on the ground that the so-called trust was actually a mere
agency.
9'BuZlen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (1916). See
also, Keeney v. New York, 222 U. S. 525, 32 Sup. Ct. 105 (1912).
Mr. Justice Holmes exs272.U. S. 567, 47 Sup. Ct. 202 (1926).
pressed a doubt whether this case could be distinguished from Bulen
v. Wisconsin, supra, note 87.
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It was held that North Carolina could not collect an inheritance
tax on the passage of the trust property when the daughter died.
The court, speaking by Air. Justice McReynolds, said:
"We think the assets of the trust estate established by the will
of Haynes had no sit-s, actual or constructive, in North Carolina. The
exercise of the power of appointment was subject to the laws of Massachusetts and nothing relative thereto was done by permission of the
State where Mrs. Taylor happened to have her domicile. No right
exercised by the donee was conferred on her by North Carolina. A
State may not subject
to taxation things wholly beyond her jurisdic'

tion or control."8

However this problem may be finally decided, it is submitted that the authorities permitting a multiple inheritance tax in
this situation do not necessarily justify a multiple property tax.
For example, a settlor who creates a trust by conveying property to a non-resident trustee may still retain an interest which
will justify the imposition of an inheritance tax by the state of
his domicile upon his death, without justifying a multiple property tax during his life, and thereafter. This distinction is
brought out in Lowry v. Los Angeles County,9" where a resident
of California had, before his death, transferred securities to an
Illinois trust company in trust for himself. On his death he bequeathed his interest in these securities partly to another resident of California, partly to residents of other states. It is held
that the securities were subject to a California inheritance tax,
but not to a property tax, as they were, of course, taxable in
Illinois, and a double property tax, the court said, is not to be
presumed.
Possibly, then, there is something still left of multiple inheritance taxation; but whatever this may be, it is not a decisive authority in favor of multiple property taxation, especially with regard to trust property; for the two kinds of taxation are distinctly different.
The somewhat dubious state of the validity of multiple
inheritance taxation is not shared by similar income taxation.
It is unquestionably valid for the state of residence of the beneficiary of a trust to compel that beneficiary to pay an income
tax upon his receipts from the trust, irrespective of what sort of
tax is or may be levied upon the trustee at his domicile. 9 1 The
272 U. S. 575.
Cal. App. 158, 175 Pac. 702 (1918).
"Harvard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 187 N. E. 596 (Mass., 1933).
'38
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Federal Supreme Court has so held in a decision 92 which seems
never to have been in any way departed from.
But income tax cases are in no sense authorities with regard
to property tax problems. Income taxes, like inheritance taxes,
are not property taxes (though they are often so referred to).s3
They are not excise or personal taxes either; they are in fact
sui generis.94 What can be done with an income tax, then, is
hardly even an argument as to property taxes.
One state court, New Hampshire, has forbidden its executive authorities to levy a property tax upon a resident beneficiary of a non-resident trust, on the ground that this would be
equivalent to imposing a property tax upon both a corporation
and its stockholders. 95 Such economic double taxation of a corporation and its stockholders may be illegal in New Hampshire,
but it is, of course, legal practically everywhere else. 9 6 But
though this fails in most jurisdictions as an effective argument
against multiple taxation of trust property, neither is it reasonably to be regarded as an argument in favor of it.
The result is that authorities as to these other forms of taxation have little, and in most cases, no bearing upon the precise
problem here presented. Conceding that the inheritance tax
cases permitting multiple taxation in this sort of situation are
still in good standing (which is extremely doubtful) they have
only a very indirect bearing upon the property tax problem;
and the income tax cases and cases approving the taxation of
both a corporation" and'its stockholders have no bearing whatsoever.
The Massachusetts case of Hunt v. Perry97 is probably the
leading case directly in favor of the proposition that a statemay validly impose a property tax upon the interest of a beneficiary in a trust, although the trustee is a resident of another
o Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct. 419 (1920), affirming
v. Tax Commissioner, 230 Mass. 503, 120 N. E. 162 (1918).
Maguire
'3 Maguire v. Trefry, supra, note 92.
See Brown, op. cit., note 1, supra.
Berry v. Windham, 59 N. H. 288 (1879).
"See Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679 (1877), where the
court says at p. 687, "The capital stock and the shares [of a corporation] may both be taxed, and it is not double taxation."
"165 Mass. 287, 43 N. E. 103 (1896). This case Is followed in
Harvard Trust (lo. v. Commissioner, supra, note 9L
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state and is taxed by the state of his residence upon the trust
property. The court takes the position that the beneficiary has
property where he is a. resident, and the fact that it may be
taxed elsewhere is wholly immaterial. The argument of the
court is well summarized in the following excerpt from the
opinion:
"The- defendants contend that the statute, if such is its true construction, is unconstitutioial. This argument rests on the ground
that the property is situated out of the state; that the beneficial interests of a cestui que trust is nowhere else made taxable; and that this
statute selects for taxation a kind of interest not otherwise taxable,
and so imposes a tax which is disproportionate. This argument, however, is met by the suggestions already made that the cestui que trust
is here, and his ownership or title is here, namely, the right to the
income of the trust fund. The fact that the corpus of the trust fund
is held by trustees who live elsewhere, and who hold under a will
proved and allowed elsewhere, does not take away the power of the
legislature to subject the interests of the cestuis que trustent to taxation here, if they live here: There is no more reason for holding this
to be beyond the power of the legislature than there would be for
holding the taxation of cattle and sheep, of manufactured goods, or of
shares in corporations, untaxable here, because situated out of the
state."91

Another state which has even more clearly and emphatically asserted its power to tax'the beneficiary of a trust on his
interest is Virginia. The Supreme Court of this state has decided several cases on this point, 99 and in all of them this position was clearly taken. The latest of these cases, Trust Co. of
Norfolk v. Commonwealth,'00 has an elaborate argument; but
this case need not be here considered at length, since it was carried- to the Federal Supreme Court; and the decision of that
court' 01 will be summarized later.
Another elaborate and careful opinion to the same effect
as to the power of the state of the beneficiary's residence is the
Vermont case of St. Albans v. Avery.1o 2 Here, too, the court
considered the constitutional problem, but sustained the valid'843 N. E. 104 (1896).
"Commonwealth v. Williams, supra, note 72; Selden v. Brooke,
104 Va. 832, 52 S.E. 632 (1906); Taylor v.Commonwealth, 124 Va.445,
98 S.E. 5 (1919); Wise v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 693, 95 S.E. 632
(1918); .Ellett v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 136, 110 S. E. 358 (1922).
See also dictum-to the same effect in Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Booker,
122 Va. 680, 95 S. E. 664 (1918).
2-151 Va. 883, 141 S. E. 825, 145 S. E. 326 (1928).
'* Safe Deposit d Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct.
59 (1929).
' 95 Vt. 249, 114 At. 31 (1921).
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ity of such a tax under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Fed10 3
eral Constitution, relying particularly upon Hunt v. Perry.
The following language of the court gives, perhaps, the gist of
its argument:
"In the instant case the beneficiaries are the equitable owners,
indeed, they are the substantial owners, of the trust fund. They have
the power to control, absolutely, the character of the securities comprising the fund, and to terminate the trust at will. They actually
owned these securities yesterday, so to speak, and may tomorrow, if
they so elect; and the entire income, less the trustee's commission for
exbcuting the trust, belongs to them. To say that, possessed of the
have
interest and rights which they have under this arrangement, they
' 10
no 'property', that they are not 'worth anything', is absurd.' '

The Federal Supreme Court declined to review this decision, when an attempt was made to attack it under the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 5
There are a number of decisions in other states claiming
the same power. Thus such a tax has been sustained in Maryland, 10 6 Maine, 10 7 Kentucky, 0 8 Ohio,' 0 9 Pennsylvania," New
i2
Hampshire,"' and Nebraska."
But as already intimated, such a holding involves a distinct
constitutional question. It has been, and may at least be reasonably contended, that such taxation, which is multiple in substance though not in form, and is certainly economically undesireble, may constitute a deprivation of property without due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution.1S The mere fact that the Federal Supreme Court has declined to pass upon any particular case of
this sort is not iiecessarily a binding authority; but there are
Supra, note 97.
114 Atl. 34 (1921). It will be noted that this language indicates that the beneficiaries could put an end to the trust at their own
discretion.
10 257 U. S. 640, 42 Sup. Ct. 51 (1921).
• McCeney v. County Commissioners, 153 Md. 25, 137 Atl. 291
(1927). But cf. Baltimore v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., supra, note 25.
1' See Augusta v. Kimball, supra, note 9.
103
Lexington v. Fishback, 109 Ky. 770, 60 S. W. 727. (1901); Henderson v. Barrett, 152 Ky. 648, 153 S. W. 992 (1913); Bingham v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 402, 251 S. W. 936 (1923).
See Tafel v. Lewis, 75 Oh. St. 182, 78 N. E. 1003 (1906).
11 See Lewis v. Chester, supra, note 73.
Crosby v. Charlestown, supra, note 69.
2
1 1n re Douglas County, supra, note 86.
n'The excerpts from Hunt v. Perry (supra, note 98) and from
St. Albans v. Avery (supra, note 104) both show that the taxpayer relied in .part on an argument of this sort.
"'
104
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unquestionably some decisions of that court which give affirmative support to the asserted power of a state to tax the beneficiary upon his interest in the trust property.
One of these is Bullen v. Wisconsin" 4 where a testator resident in Wisconsin made a transfer in trust of certain securities to an Illinois trustee. Upon his death this transfer was
held subject to the Wisconsin inheritance tax (mainly because
the testator had reserved the income from the property) although Illinois had taxed the fund, "as it might.""z 5 While
this is not strictly in point, yet it has close relation to the property tax problem and may certainly be regarded as at least an
inferential approval by the court of the validity of such multiple taxation."'
Another case, which is still less in point, but has, with some
slight justification, been cited by various state courts in asserting this power to tax the beneficiary's interest,"z7 is Fidelity &
Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville."5 Here it is held that a resident of Kentucky might be taxed in Kentucky on bank accounts
in Mfissouri, though these bank accounts had also been taxed in
Missouri on the theory that they had a "business situs" there.
The opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes is rather brief but clearly
states that multiple taxation is unobjectionable. If it is really
unobjectionable, it certainly seems that it would be held likewise
unobjectionable in the situation here presented.
On the other hand the authorities against multiple taxation
of this sort, while rather less numerous, are of increasing
weight. There seems to be practically unanimous agreement
among students of the subject that such taxation is economically undesirable and unfair. 1 9 Furthermore, a few state
courts have definitely declined to permit the taxation of a resident beneficiary where the trustee is a resident of another state.
MISupra, note 87.

1-240 U. S. 625 (1915).
16 Cf. as to the present standing of this case what is said about
it in Wachovia-Bank d Trust Co. v. Doughton, supra, note 88.
,, Especially in Bingham v. Commonweath, supra, note 108.
"8245 U. S. 54, 38 Sup. Ct. 40 (1917).
SNote in 30 Col. L. R. Zoc. cit., supra, note 81; note in 41 Harv.
L. R. loc. cit., supra, note 28. But cf. note in (1930) 43 Harv. L. R.
668. And see Lowndes, oV. cit., supra, note 16.
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At least three states, Florida, 120 California, 12 1 and Arkansas 122 have quite definitely taken the position that such a tax
would be illegal, or at least so undesirable as to be practically
outside the power of the state legislature. And several other
state courts which have, under certain circumstances, sustained
such a tax, have nevertheless declared it illegal under other
circumstances. Such are Massachusetts, 12 Maryland,'1 24 New
Hampshire, 125 and Pennsylvania. 26 In most of these latter instances this result was reached because of a particular statute, 127 or at least because the court felt that the legislature had
not clearly evidenced the desire to impose this sort of multiple
taxation. Nevertheless, the fact that these courts are not ready
to construe a general taxing statute so as to impose such a tax
is at least an implied admission that it is undesirable and, therefore, of somewhat dubious validity.
Furthermore, the Federal Supreme Court has in recent
years taken a position which is distinctly hostile to the taxation
by a state of the interest of a beneficiary in a non-resident trust.
The first of these cases is Brook v. Norfolk. 1 28 Here the plaintiff was a Virginia resident and had a life estate in a trust fund
created in Maryland and held by a trustee in that state. The
trust res consisted of intangible property. Virginia assumed
to tax the plaintiff on her interest in the property, computing
such interest at the entire value of the property. This tax was
held to be invalid.
The case is not, however, a very conclusive authority. In
the first place the precise nature of the tax is not entirely clear.
It was apparently a property tax, but it is also said that the
plaintiff had paid a tax to Virginia on what she "received."
Furthermore, as has already been indicated, the very brief opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes is by no means clear. And finallythough in view of what has been said this does not seem very
State v. Beardsley, supra, note 66.
Lowry v. Los Angeles County, supra, note 90.
Greene County v. Smith, supra, note 34.
mDorr v..Boston, 6 Gray 131 (Mass., 1856). See also, Davis v.
Macey, supra, note 26.
"2 See Kinhart v. Howard, supra, note 11.
22.Berry v. Windham, supra, note 95.
Im Carlisle v. Marshall, supra, note 29.
121ee especially, Dorr v. Boston, supra, note 123.
-'277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 422 (1928).
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important-the testator who created the trust seems to have
been a resident of Maryland rather than of Virginia. 2 9
A far more important authority is the decision, a year later,
of Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia.130 Here a father living
in Virginia conveyed securities to a Maryland trust company in
trust to be accumulated for his infant sons living in Virginia,
until they respectively reached the age of twenty-five, then to
be distributed to them or their issue if they had died. While the
property was thus held, it was taxed by Maryland. Virginia
also attempted to tax the full value of the securities, on the
ground that this was a tax on the equitable interests of the
infant beneficiaries, who were, as already stated, residents of
Virginia.
The Virginia tax was held to be invalid as beyond the jurisdiction of that state. The position of the court is made clear
by the following excerpts from the opinion by Mr. Justice
MeReynolds:
"Ordinarily this Court recognizes that the fiction of mobilia sequuntur personam may be applied in order to determine the situs of
intangible personal property for taxation. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277
U. S. 1. But the general rule must yield to established fact of legal
ownership, actual presence and control elsewhere, and ought not to be
applied if so to do would result -in inescapable and patent injustice,
whether through double taxation or otherwise. State Board of Asses8ors v. Comrptoir National d'Escompte, 191 U. S. 388, 404; Buck v.
Beach, 206 U. S. 392, 408. Liverpool & L. d r. Ins. Co. v. Orleans
Assessors, 221 U. S. 346, 354; Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12, 17. Here,
where the possessor of the legal title holds the securities in Maryland,
thus giving them a permanent situs for lawful taxation there, and no
person in Virginia has present right to their enjoyment or power to
remove them, the fiction must be disregarded. It plainly conflicts with
fact; the securities did not and could not follow any person domiciled
in Virginia. Their actual situs is in Maryland and can not be changed
by the cestuis que trustent.
The power of Virginia to lay a tax upon the fair value of any
Interest in the securities actually owned by one of her resident citizens
is not ' now presented for consideration. See Maguire v. Trefry,

s8upra.' m

The court thus took the position that the property was actually situated with the trustee in Maryland and could not be
taxed again on the theory or fiction of a beneficial interest in the
same propertr in Virginia. Yet it will be noted that the court
'2Trust Co. of Norfolk v. Commonwealth, supra, note 100, relied
on this point to distinguish the case.
2,Supra, note 101, reversing Trust Co. of Norfolk v. Commonwealth, supra, note 100.
="280 U. S. 92 (1929).
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did not explicitly deny the power of Virginia to levy a tax upon
the interest of the beneficiaries ifthe value of that interest were
properly computed. This suggestion perhaps resulted from,
but is at any rate made more explicit by, a concession to that
effect in the argument by the taxpayers' counsel. 132

It is fur-

ther emphasized by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stone,
who says in part:
"If the question were here I should not be prepared to go so far
as to say that the equitable rights in personam of the beneficiaries of
the trust might not have been taxed at the place of their domicile
quite as much as a debt secured by a mortgage on land in another
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that the land is also taxed at its
situs. See Union Refrigerator Transit Go. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S.194,
205; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491; Savings Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S.
421, 431. In neither case, if the threat of double taxation were controlling, which under the decisions it is not, Fidelity & Columbia Trust
Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S.54, 58; Cream of Wheat Go. v. Grand'Forks
Co., 253 U. S. 325, 330; Citizens National Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99,
3,09; cf. Swiss Oil Corporation v. Shanks, 273 U. S. 407, 413, would it
seem that in any real sense is there double taxation, since the legal
interests protected and taxed by the two taxing jurisdictions are ditferent."1

Mr. Justice Stone then reaches his conclusion because he
considers that the beneficial interests of the boys in Virginia
were taxable but were not worth the total value of the securities
since their interests were limited by the possibility of their dying
before reaching the age cf twenty-five. Mr. Justice M\eReynolds, as already shown, partially concedes the correctness of
this view, though laying more stress upon the theory that Virginia was assuming to tax property outside its jurisdiction. And
it must be added that Mr. Justice Holmes dissented from the
opinion of the court, taking the position squarely that such multiple taxation to the full value of the property is entirely justifiable.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia,13 4 then, is not a definite authority that the property of a beneficiary can never be
taxed apart from the trustee. Nevertheless, it goes a long way
toward a declaration that such taxation contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In fact, there
- 280 U. S.85 (1929). "We do not now contend that the State of
Virginia could not constitutionally tax whatever may be the value of
the cestui's interest."
280 U. S. 96 (1929). Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred in this
opinion.
231
Supra, note 101.
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is no other way to rationalize Mr. Justice McReynolds's opinion,
in which a majority of the court concurred. And furtherniore,
such an interpretation of the decision is the only one which is
consonant with the present strong tendency of the court to do
away with economic double taxation as between the states. 135
From the standpoint of principle and of the authorities from
the same court then, this interpretation of the decision seems
both proper and desirable.
And it has been fully accepted by the Maryland Supreme
Court, which was formerly a leader in the atteinpt to support
the power of the state where a beneficiary of a trust was domiciled to tax him on his beneficial interest. 136 In the very recent
case of Baltimore v. Gibbs1 37 that court held that such a tax
upon the interest of a Maryland beneficiary in funds held in
trust for her in Pennsylvania would contravene the Federal Constitution. The court discussed various recent decisions of the
Federal Supreme Court, especially Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Virginia,138 and indicated its acceptance of the theory that such
decisions indicate a determination to do away entirely with such
burdensome multiple taxation as between the states, in the following language:
"The state tax commission, in a reasoned opinion quoted by counsel
in this case, although conceding the jurisdiction of the state of the
situs to levy such a tax, inferred that double taxation of corpus of
intangibles had never been held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
and concluded that it could not be so held because of some consequences that could not be accepted, such as prevention of the taxation
of mortgages of bonds held within the state and secured by property
outside the state, or of shares of stock held by residents in foreign
corporations the property of which is out of the state. But it is the
understanding of this court that the Supreme Court has now definitely
deduced from the Fourteenth Amendment what it has described as a
" See the cases cited in note 3, supra. It will be noted that the
court in Hunt v. Perry, supra, note 97, in the excerpt from the opinion
cited in note 98, takes the position that such multiple taxation is
justified by the power of a state to tax tangible personal property of a resident, though such property is permanently situated outside the taxing state. Unfortunately for this argument, it is now well
settled that a state has no such power. Union Refrigerator Co. v
Kentucky, 199 U. S.194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36 (1905). The same may be said,
of course, as to the supposed power of a state to levy a tax upon the
stock of domestic corporations held by non-residents. First National
Bank of Boston v. Maine, supra, note 3.
"4McCeney v. County Commissioners, supra, note 106. See also,
Humbird v. State Tax Commission, supra, note 26.
171 Atl. 37 (Md., 1934).
"u Supra, note 101.
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'rule of immunity from taxation by more than one state,' for intangibles
as well as for tangibles. 'The rule of immunity from taxation by more
than one state, deducible from the decisions in respect of these various
and distinct kinds of property, is broader than the applications thus
far made of it.' First NationaZ Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 326."''1

With reference to Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, the
court said:
"Taking the tax, then, to be one on the principal of the property,
or o'n part of the total of rights which constitute the property, it seems
to differ from the tax levied on the whole corpus which in Sale Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia was held unconstitutional only as a part
differs from the whole. No legal distinction can be drawn, we think,
between taxing the whole corpus because of the benefit received by the
resident from it, and taxing so much of it as represents her share in
it upon a capitalization of her income. The whole value, including every
part of the rights in it, is taxed at the site, and taxation in Maryland
on the basis of a share in the principal would seem to be double taxation. For these reasons the court is of opinion, as stated, that the
present tax is unconstitutional.!'"

For the reasons already stated at length, it is submitted
that this interpretation of the Safe Deposit & Trust Co. case is
the correct one. 4 1 The Maryland court seems to be justified in
its conclusion that the wavering suggestions of the Federal
Supreme Court in that case as to a possible right to tax the
beneficiary's interest were really merely put in out of abundant
caution, and that the court must and will decide, when the question is squarely presented, that the states have no such power
to any extent whatever. When the Suprenie Court has gone
so far to invalidate multiple taxation of other sorts, some of
which is economically and otherwise much more easily defendable, it is certainly not to be expected that it will hesitate to do
away with this more outrageous and indeed wholly indefensible
form.
CONCLUSION
It

appears then that the normal method of taxing intan-

gible trust property-and there is, of course, little question with
respect to tangible property-is to tax it to the trustee at his
domicile.

If there are two or more trustees residing in differ-

ent jurisdictions, the value of the property should normally be
apportioned between such trustees for this purpose.

Various

'171 Atl. 38-9 (1934).
''171 Atl. 40 (1934).
11 1t is criticized, however, in (1934) 47 Harv. L. R. 1224.
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other suggestions have been made, and are supported by some
authority, for varying this rule in peculiar instances. However,
an examination of these suggestions indicates that, whatever
thleir theoretical validity, they are apt to be difficult to operate,
and at any rate are not as convenient as the regular method of
taxing the property to the trustee.
As to the suggestion that the beneficiary should also be
taxed at his domicile on his interest in such trust property, it
may be confidently asserted that such tax would be extremely
burdensome and unjust. Furthermore, it is believed to be a necessary consequence of the decision of a number of recent Federal Supreme Court cases involving such multiple taxation between the states, and especially of Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Virginia,14 2 that such multiple taxation is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,
as depriving the beneficiary of his property without due process
of law. Such a result is sound and desirable; for such a burden
is unreasonable. It follows that the sound rule is that intangible property held in trust is to be taxed to the trustee at his
domicile and is not to be taxed again to the beneficiary or otherwise.

'" Supra, note 101.
K. L. J.-3

